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Abstract— As cloud becomes the tool of choice for more data 
storage services, the number of service providers has also 
increased. With these choices, organisations have a wide 
selection of services available to move their data to the cloud.  
However, the responsibility to maintain the security of sensitive 
data stored therein remains paramount. This paper will discuss 
some of the challenges of securing a cloud storage and putting it 
into context by reviewing relevant literature. The challenges 
associated with the three important security aspects 
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) are discussed 
together with the vulnerabilities linked to them. It is important 
to look into these challenges as cloud storage is not only about 
technological evolution but involves security considerations. We 
aim to provide insights of security challenges and its solutions to 
enhance cloud storage implementation.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
ISK storage is an essential computer component to 
retain data. Well-known as being the leading 
expenditure in any IT projects, the growth is projected to rise 
annually in most organisations. Therefore,  more and more 
users and organisations have moved their data to the cloud to 
save cost, utilise resources and have worldwide access [1][2].  
A cloud storage concept comes simultaneously with the 
rise of cloud computing. It has the facility to store data on the 
cloud, available anytime and anywhere at lower cost. In other 
words, it is the storage component of cloud computing. Yet, 
sharing the cloud with other users possess risks and concerns 
over security. Users raised concerns whether their data are 
accessed by unauthorised person since there are many user 
sharing the resources over the cloud. This has also been 
supported by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) in their 
statistical overview of vulnerabilities. It has been reported by 
CSA [3] that the major concerns on security issues are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
According to their report, the highest incident occurred from 
threats of insecure Application Programming Interface/s 
(APIs), followed closely by data loss and leakage and thirdly, 
hardware failure from twelve threats defined by CSA. In short, 
this paper discusses some security challenges in cloud storage 
and putting it into context by reviewing relevant literature.  
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II.  GENERAL ARCHITECTURE 
Cloud storage architectures are mainly about delivering 
storage on demand in a highly scalable and multi-tenant way. 
Basically, cloud storage architectures contain of a front end that 
exports an API to communicate with the backend storage.  
In traditional storage systems, this API is the SCSI protocol; 
nonetheless in the cloud, these are evolving protocols. At this 
layer, there are Web service, file-based Internet SCSI or iSCSI 
front ends. This layer is the first communication point between 
the user and the service provider. Users access the services 
using their credentials. The midpoint component is a layer 
called storage controller that interconnects and communicates 
from the front API to the backend storages. This layer has a 
variety of features such as replication, traditional data-
placement algorithms with geographical location. Finally, the 
back-end consist of physical storage for data. This may be a 
central protocol that runs dedicated programs or a traditional 
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Figure 1 Cloud Vulnerabilities Incidents by Threats [3] 
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back-end to the physical disks.  
There are mainly three types of cloud storage; public, private 
and hybrid cloud storage. Public cloud storage is usually built 
for large-scale users and has shared resource infrastructure. A 
private cloud that is also known as an internal cloud storage 
serves a specific group of users. Unlike the public cloud 
storage, private cloud storage resides in a controlled 
environment to meet safety and performance requirements. The 
final type is the hybrid cloud storage that is a combination of 
both public and private cloud storage.  
The underlying reason for this segregation of cloud storage 
types is the fact that it serves a focused group of users. The 
biggest issue is security. Users are unlikely to entrust their data 
to a third party company without having a guarantee that they 
are able to access their data whenever they want and no one else 
is able to access it at all. This explains clearly why there are 
different deployment models in adopting cloud services. 
III.  SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Cloud storage is a service that includes inherent 
vulnerabilities, but these have never disuaded users from taking 
advantage of its economies and flexibilities. With adoption of a 
cloud model, users lose control over physical security. In fact 
in a public cloud storage, users are sharing the computing 
resources with other users. Security overall covers mainly three 
aspects: confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). These 
aspects are the topmost considerations in designing a security 
measure to ensure maximum protection. This is reflected with 
the vulnerabilities incidents results from CSA as the figure 3. In 
short, confidentiality involves protecting data and information 
from disclosure to unauthorised person. Integrity refers to 
protecting data and information from being modified by 
unauthorised person. On the other hand, availability is ensuring 
the authorised people are able to access and use the data and 
information whenever required. In this paper, the challenges are 
derived from the known vulnerabilities. Securing access to 
protected data and information is restricted to certain level of 
user authorised to access it. This requires mechanisms to be in 
place to control the access of protected data. The sophistication 
of the access control mechanisms should be in parity with the 
value of the information being protected; the more sensitive or 
valuable the information the stronger the control mechanisms 
need to be. The foundation on which access control 
mechanisms are built starts with authentication, authorisation 
and encryption. Secondly, protecting data from loss and leakage 
involves integrity of many parties involved in providing the 
resources. Some schemes and mechanism are needed to ensure 
the data and information kept on the cloud is unaltered or 
removed. It is suggested to practice auditing techniques such as 
proof-of-retrivebility and proof-of-data possession to enable 
verification. Subsequently, as access and data are getting 
secured, it is important to keep the hardware high-available. 
The hardware is the infrastructure hosting the services to store 
data and information. Without ensuring failover, the services 
are unable to meet the uptime and comply with service level 
managements. Discussions of each security challenge and 
related previous research is described below.  
 
A.  Securing Access 
Data confidentiality remains one of the main concerns and 
the major barrier to the development of cloud services. It is 
vulnerable to conventional threats (injection attacks, cross-site 
scripting etc.) [4] but also to specific cloud computing threats 
(hypervisor flaws, management of the security perimeter within 
an organisation and confidence in the provider) [5].  
Among the obvious dissimilarities between cloud storage 
and traditional storage is the way it is accessed as shown in 
figure 4. Web service APIs are the common ones although most 
providers have multiple access methods. These web service 
APIs are designed according to Representational State Transfer 
(REST) principles, which imply an object-based scheme 
running on top of HTTP i.e., using HTTP as a transport. REST 
APIs are stateless, thus making them simple to apply. Some 
cloud storage providers use REST APIs, mostly Amazon 
Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) and Windows Azure™ 
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[6]. There is a major downfall of Web service APIs that is the 
requirement to do integration when being used with cloud 
storage. Consequently, other types of access methods are also 
implemented with cloud storage to fulfil instant integration 
requirement such as file-based protocol (NFS/CIFS, FTP or 
iSCSI). Cloud storage providers such as Six Degrees provide 
these types of access methods [6]. 
Though the protocols mentioned above are the most 
common, there are other protocols suitable for cloud storage. 
Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) 
is an interesting protocol that is created on HTTP and allows 
the Web to be a readable and writable source. Prevalent 
providers of WebDAV include Zetta and Cleversafe [7]. Some 
solutions have also supported multi-protocol access for 
example, a cloud storage that enables both file-based (NFS and 
CIFS) and SAN-based protocols from the same storage-
virtualization infrastructure. 
Access security measures are generally considered in three 
steps: Identification & Authentication, Authorisation and 
Encryption. 
 
1)  Identification and Authentication 
Password security heavily depends on creating strong 
passwords and protecting them from getting stolen. Researchers 
have established that strong passwords are necessarily long, 
random and hard to crack but often difficult to remember. Bang 
et al. suggests that security is not just a technical issue but also 
a behavioural issue involving users, mostly untrained ones [8]. 
It was also presented that humans have limited memory 
capacity therefore the use of long random passwords is almost 
impossible. In their study, a new vulnerability measure from a 
network perspective is suggested that captures the structural 
characteristics of the Identification–Password (ID-PW) usage 
network. Public awareness and support from the country’s 
government is said to be the backbone in ensuring overall 
security. On the other hand, Zhao et al. built a Cloud-based 
storage free BPM designed to achieve a high level of security 
with desired CIA [9]. The password manager is integrated with 
web browsers but this technique possesses risks of keystroke 
logger if the user log-in from an anti-malware program. 
Generation of password structure at highest probabilistic order 
to make password-cracking harder using the right 
word-mangling rule [10] is said to be able to assist users in 
selecting their own memorable password even though it is 
argued that as long users are able to choose their own 
passwords, the attacks can break password more easily than 
through a brute-force attack. A password strength evaluation of 
password-guessing algorithm results in effectiveness of a 
dictionary-check that depends heavily on the choice of 
dictionary. There is a strong relationship of both 
password-composition policies and metrics for quantifying 
password security [11].  
2)  Authorisation 
An authorisation process ensures that a person has the right 
to assess a certain resources and limits of the access unknowing 
of other user’s information. Users may have access but have a 
specific role or authority to do something within their scope. A 
privacy protecting authorisation infrastructure that provides a 
web service interface for cloud providers to use and application 
developers may then use this to further develop privacy 
preserving applications. The authorisation infrastructure does 
not obviate the need for trust but rather is built on the 
assumption that cloud providers can be trusted to the extent that 
they wish to provide an automated infrastructure that can easily 
enforce each other’s policies reliably and automatically [12]. 
A paper suggested an authorisation model suitable for cloud 
services that supports hierarchical role-based access control 
(RBAC), path-based object hierarchies and federation [13] in 
multi-tenancy environment. These features provide a 
convenient authorisation service for cloud, especially those 
using path-based patterns such as REST APIs. 
Although authorisation usually supports high scalability, it is 
believed to improve scalability and this would hopefully enable 
more fine-grained control on the authorisation information.  
 
3)  Encryption 
It is a standard approach to apply encryption techniques into 
sensitive data to secure it. Encryption has always been seen as 
the ultimate security measure but it also comes with a set of 
difficulties. Traditional encryption is done by transferring the 
data files locally and decrypting it. Today, encryption is done 
in many ways. Table 1 shows the review of encryption methods 
and approaches. Previous literature shows [14] extensive 
research on encoding and decoding information in order to 
guarantee privacy. 
A cryptographic cloud storage system called CS2 was 
amongst early research done on applying symmetric encryption 
techniques that ensures conﬁdentiality, integrity and 
veriﬁability without being resource hungry [15]. Recently, a 
Cloud storage encryption (CSE) framework was proposed also 
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using a symmetric, searchable encryption with policy and 
access methods [14].  
An Attribute-based encryption (ABE) with verification and 
recovery technique was proposed to effectively secure the data 
and provide recovery mechanism [16]. A different paper 
suggested ABE encryption was an efficient data retrieval 
scheme best suited for cloud storage systems with massive 
amount of data [17].  
A fine-grained and cryptographic access control for cloud 
storage services called CS-CACS uses CP-ABE which is 
implemented based on the Hadoop Distributed File System 
(HDFS) environment [18] to efficiently secure user data. An 
approach was introduced [19] using user-centric privacy 
preserving cryptographic access control protocol, K2C (Key To 
Cloud) that enables end-users to store and share sensitive data 
securely in untrusted cloud storage for hierarchically organised 
data. It uses two cryptographic libraries, Hierarchical Identity-
Based Encryption and Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption.  
B.  Data Protection 
Cloud storage that holds data and information on the cloud is 
obligated on data integrity. Data integrity depends on the 
assurance pursued by the user that data are unaltered on the 
provider infrastructure. Data integrity threats involve both 
malicious third party occurrences and hosting infrastructure 
weaknesses.  
This issue is well studied in the literature with the 
introduction of Proof-of-Retrievability (POR) and Proof-of-
Data Possession (PDP) protocols [20][21]. These techniques 
allow detecting data integrity damages without requiring a copy 
of the user local data. The idea was to encode the protocol with 
the data before storing it.  
Some improved versions were developed to make it compact 
[22] and high-available, HAIL [23]. Nevertheless, these 
techniques involve pre-processing the data before storing it 
externally to the provider.  With the aim of making it more 
dynamic, new approaches were introduced using algebraic 
signatures and making it more flexible [24], [25].  
There has also been research that looks into auditing the 
security of cloud storage. A publicly auditable cloud data 
storage (TPA) suggested that an interface layer can help user 
assess risks [26, 27, 28].   
Another issue was also raised as users found that even if they 
accidentally deleted their data, the provider can restore a 
backup file. This means the data is still kept by the provider. In 
FADE [29], a secure overlay with file assured deletion is 
presented. It is a policy-based scheme that reliably removes 
files and withdraw file-access policies on it. Thus, even if a data 
is restored by a provider, the file is restricted from read/write as 
the file-access policies are revoked.  
On the other hand, accountability is known as one of the 
preventive controls to protect data privacy in the cloud. It 
enhance trusts and manage risks. A research done by Pearson et 
al. [30] provides a solution called A4Cloud that ensure trusts 
are not breached. It supports CSPs by enabling techniques such 
as audited policy enforcement, assessment of possible policy 
violations effects, violations detection and incidents 
management. 
 
C.  Ensured Redundancy 
Data availability is critical. Cloud storage providers must 
guarantee that the data will always be available autonomously 
regardless of hardware failures, corrupted physical disks or 
downtime. Hardware failures can happen at any time. This 
includes failures caused by environmental failures such as a 
natural disaster, flood or even fire. 
A hardware design should be built on a basis of having 
redundancy and a minimum single points of failure. At the 
design phase, the analyst creates a physical hardware map that 
shows all the connection points for server, storage, network and 
software. CloudSim was introduced for modelling Cloud 
environments and performance testing application services. 
Among components that can be modelled are virtualization 
(VMs), clustered configurations, multi data centres points (used 
for disaster recovery centres) and backups which are known to 
have high-availability and fault-tolerance [31].   
Calder et al. presented the case of a cloud storage provider, 
Windows Azure (WAS) on the combination of strong 
consistency, global partitioned namespace and disaster 
recovery has been the important features in ensuring 
availability of the multi-tenancy environment [32]. This has 
reduced the storage cost significantly than the cost of running 
all workloads on a dedicated hardware. Therefore, it is said that 
having redundant resources is essential to prevent downtime 
from happening in cloud environments. 
Table 1 Review of Encryption Methods and Approaches 
Encryption 
methods  Approach  Limitation 
Symmetric 
cryptography 
(Private-key)  
Searchable symmetric 
encryption  
[15] [14] 
The key used 
to encrypt and 
decrypt data 
must remain 
secure because 
anyone with 
access to it can 
read the coded 
messages.  
Asymmetric 
cryptography 
(Public key) 
Attribute-
based 
Encryption 
(ABE) 
 
 
 
 
 
Attribute-based 
Encryption 
(ABE) [16] 
Encryption are 
more complex 
compared to 
symmetric 
encryption and 
takes longer to 
encrypt and 
decrypt.  
Needs 
verification of 
the public key 
authenticity. 
Searchable ABE 
[17] 
Cipher text-
policy Attribute-
based 
Encryption (CP-
ABE) [18] 
Hierarchical 
Identity-Based 
Encryption and 
Key-Policy 
Attribute-Based 
Encryption [19] 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The cloud is a multi-tenant environment, where resources are 
shared. Threats can happen from anywhere; inside the shared 
environment or from outside of it. However, placing sensitive 
data in a shared cloud storage is apparently risky. Whether 
accidental or due to a malicious hacker attack, data privacy, loss 
or leakage and unavailable for access would be a major security 
violation involving confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
The best strategy is to practice all security measures such as 
access control, encryption, auditing and redundancy to ensure 
the data are protected from every angle and gaining overall 
security.  
We have presented a review of challenges in enhancing cloud 
storage security. As shown in Table 2, the evaluation of existing 
approaches covers many aspects of security measures such as 
password protection, policy enforcement, access control etc. 
Recent advances on security measures indicate security is a 
continuously interesting aspect in the cloud.  Each security 
challenges are discussed specifically in section III with its 
recent advances. These advances can be used as a reference in 
exploring new security researches in cloud storage. 
This paper provides a brief explanation on cloud storage. 
Mainly, it describes the security challenges together with the 
recent advances for each challenges. This is done by reviewing 
previous literature and putting it into context. We are also 
looking into emerging approaches and technologies that may be 
potentially continued and improved for future research. 
Therefore, in our next stage of research, a thorough work will 
be introduced. An overview of future work is described in the 
last section. 
 
 
V.  FUTURE WORK 
In this research, a comprehensive framework focusing on the 
integrated security layers of a cloud storage architecture is 
being evaluated. This framework is aimed to be more dynamic 
and localised in nature and intended to emphasis on security 
methodology that varies dynamically from many layers. The 
framework will also focus on providing security on demand to 
the cloud storage and its security measure depends on the value 
of data stored by the user.   
One size may not necessarily fit all. There are diverse 
systems and varied resources in the cloud, a single security 
framework would be excessively rigid for certain applications 
and if there is less security, vulnerability threats are apparent 
for some applications like financial applications. On the other 
hand, if the cloud has a common security methodology in place, 
it will be easily targeted for hackers because such threats makes 
the whole cloud vulnerable to attacks.  
Therefore, in such a scenario, if customised security is 
designed, it would make sense. Though there are many practical 
concerns regarding to dynamic security the future work is much 
concentrated to derive a framework which targets these 
concepts and provide a practical solution for cloud storage. 
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Table 2 Evaluation of Existing Approaches 
Approach  Password  Policy 
Access 
control 
Federation  Encryption  Verification  Recovery  Auditing  Compact 
High 
Available 
Dynamic 
Fault 
Tolerant 
Secured 
Access 
 
[8]  √                       
[9]  √                       
[10]  √                       
[11]  √  √                     
[12]    √  √                   
[13]    √  √  √                 
[14]    √      √               
[15]          √  √          √   
[16]          √  √  √           
[17]          √    √           
[18]      √    √    √           
[19]      √    √               
Data 
Protection 
[20]          √      √         
[21]          √      √         
[22]                  √       
[23]                    √     
[24]                      √   
[25]                      √   
[26]                √         
[27]                √         
[28]                √         
[29]    √            √         
  [30]    √            √         
Ensured 
Redundancy 
[31]              √      √    √ 
[32]              √           
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